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ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF LEARNING IN GAMES WITH
STOCHASTICALLY PERTURBED PAYOFF OBSERVATIONS
MARIO BRAVO AND PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS
Abstract. Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical
applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where
players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject
to noise and random disturbances. First, in the single-player case (correspond-
ing to an agent trying to adapt to an arbitrarily changing environment), we
show that the stochastic dynamics under study lead to no regret almost surely,
irrespective of the noise level in the player’s observations. In the multi-player
case, we find that dominated strategies become extinct and we show that strict
Nash equilibria are stochastically stable and attracting; conversely, if a state
is stable or attracting with positive probability, then it is a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we provide an averaging principle for 2-player games, and we show
that in zero-sum games with an interior equilibrium, time averages converge
to Nash equilibrium for any noise level.
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2 M. BRAVO AND P. MERTIKOPOULOS
1. Introduction
A central question in game-theoretic learning is whether the outcome of a learn-
ing process (viewed here as a plausible model for the behavior of optimizing agents)
is also justifiable from the point of view of rationality – e.g. whether the process
leads to a Nash equilibrium or a state where no dominated strategies are present. In
that regard, one of the most widely studied learning procedures is the exponential
weight (EW) algorithm that was originally introduced by Vovk (1990) and Lit-
tlestone and Warmuth (1994) in the context of multi-armed bandit problems. In
a game-theoretic setting, the algorithm simply prescribes that players score their
actions based on their cumulative payoffs and then assign choice probabilities pro-
portionally to the exponential of each action’s score. As such, the EW algorithm
in continuous time (Sorin, 2009) is described by the dynamics
y˙kα = vkα,
xkα =
exp(ykα)∑
β exp(ykβ)
,
(EW)
where, somewhat informally, vkα denotes the payoff to the α-th action of player k,
ykα is the action’s performance score (cumulative payoff) over time and xkα is the
corresponding mixed strategy weight.
Given its long history and its link with the replicator dynamics of evolutionary
game theory (discussed below), the rationality properties of (EW) are also relatively
well understood. To name the most important ones: a) dominated strategies be-
come extinct in the long run; b) limits of interior trajectories and stable rest points
are Nash equilibria; c) strict equilibria are stable and attracting; and d) empirical
distributions of play converge to equilibrium in 2-player zero-sum games with an in-
terior equilibrium (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sandholm, 2010). More recently,
Sorin (2009) also showed that (EW) is universally consistent, i.e. players have
no regret for following (EW) instead of any other fixed strategy in a dynamically
changing environment.
On the other hand, a crucial limitation in the above considerations is that play-
ers are assumed to have perfect observations of their actions’ rewards. In practi-
cal applications of game theory (e.g. in economics, finance and traffic networks),
“perfect feedback” requirements are often too stringent, especially in games with
massively many actions and/or players. Accordingly, an important question that
arises is whether (EW) retains its rationality properties in the presence of noise and
stochastically perturbed payoff observations. Somewhat surprisingly, this is indeed
the case (at least for some of them): even if the payoffs in (EW) are perturbed by
a Brownian noise term of arbitrarily high variance, dominated strategies become
extinct and strict equilibria remain stable and attracting with high probability
(Mertikopoulos and Moustakas, 2009, 2010). Thus, even when the players’ true
payoffs are masked by noise and uncertainty, the reinforcement learning principle
behind (EW) allows players to weed out the noise and leads to similar outcomes as
in the noiseless, deterministic regime.
Motivated by the robustness of exponential learning in noisy environments, we
examine here a broad class of game-theoretic learning procedures where players
adjust their strategies by playing an approximate best response to the vector of their
actions’ cumulative payoffs – possibly subject to random disturbances and noise. In
the case of perfect payoff observations, this scheme boils down to the reinforcement
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learning dynamics considered by Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) who showed
that the properties discussed above still hold in the absence of noise. With this in
mind, our main contribution is to show that feedback noise does not really matter:
even if the players’ payoff observations are subject to arbitrarily high (and possibly
state-dependent or correlated) noise, dominated strategies become extinct (roughly
at the same rate as in deterministic environments); strict Nash equilibria remain
(stochastically) stable and attracting; and, in the converse direction, if a state is
(stochastically) stable or attracting with positive probability, then it is also a Nash
equilibrium. Finally, if players use a decreasing learning parameter to adjust the
weight of their scoring process over time, the stochastic learning dynamics under
study lead to no regret (a.s.) and their time average converges to equilibrium in
2-player zero-sum games with an interior equilibrium.
Our analysis also highlights an important difference between “static” solution
concepts (such as Nash equilibria and strategic dominance) and more “dynamic”
notions (such as regret minimization). Whereas the speed of convergence to static
target states is accelerated by the use of a large, constant learning parameter (noise
and disturbances notwithstanding), the rate of regret minimization is optimized by
using a learning parameter that decays proportionally to t−1/2 (and which guaran-
tees an O(√t log log t) bound for the players’ cumulative regret under uncertainty).
This disparity only appears in the noisy regime and is due to the fact that players
need to be more conservative when facing a fluid environment that varies with time
in an (a priori) unpredictable fashion. Otherwise, if players have access to noiseless
payoff observations, they can be signficantly more greedy and achieve lower regret
faster by using a constant learning parameter.
1.1. Related work. The long-term rationality properties of exponential learning
in a game-theoretic setting were first studied in conjunction with those of the repli-
cator dynamics, one of the most widely studied dynamical systems for population
evolution under natural selection. Indeed, a simple differentiation of (EW) reveals
that the evolution of the players’ mixed strategies under (EW) follows the differen-
tial equation:
x˙kα = xkα
[
vkα −
∑
β
xkβvkβ
]
, (RD)
which is simply the (multi-population) replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker
(1978). In this context, Akin (1980), Nachbar (1990) and Samuelson and Zhang
(1992) showed that dominated strategies become extinct, while it is well known that
a) stable states of (RD) are Nash equilibria; b) strict Nash equilibria are asymp-
totically stable; and c) time averages of replicator orbits converge to equilibrium in
2-player games provided that no strategy share becomes arbitrarily small (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998, 2003).
This two-way relationship between exponential learning and the replicator dy-
namics was noted early on by Rustichini (1999) in his study of reinforcement learn-
ing models for games – i.e. learning how to react to a given situation so as to
maximize a numerical reward (Sutton and Barto, 1998). From a game-theoretic
point of view, the learning models of Börgers and Sarin (1997) and Erev and Roth
(1998) are also closely related to the replicator dynamics – and, hence, to (EW) –
while Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), and Hopkins
(2002) studied a smooth variant of the well-known fictitious play algorithm where
the players play a perturbed best response to their opponents’ empirical frequency
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of play.1 Up to mild technical differences, the correlated version of these models can
be seen as a noiseless version of our reinforcement learning model, viz. the dynam-
ics of Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) with the parameter choice η(t) = 1/t;
we explore this relation in more detail in Sections 3 and 6.
Of course, a crucial aspect of these considerations is whether players have accu-
rate observations of their actions’ rewards or only a noisy estimate thereof: if the
former is not the case, noise and fluctuations could potentially lead to suboptimal
outcomes with high probability. In biology and evolutionary game theory (where
payoffs measure the reproductive fitness of a biological species or the average pay-
off of populations of nonatomic players respectively), Fudenberg and Harris (1992)
accounted for such fluctuations by introducing a stochastic variant of the replicator
dynamics where evolution is perturbed by “aggregate shocks” that reflect the impact
of weather-like effects and other perturbations.2 In this framework, Cabrales (2000),
Imhof (2005) and Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) showed that dominated strategies are
still eliminated if the variability of the shocks across different genotypes (strategies)
is not too high, while Imhof (2005) and Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) showed that
strict Nash equilibria of a modified game are stochastically asymptotically stable
under the replicator dynamics with aggregate shocks.3
On the other hand, Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2009, 2010) showed that
the dynamics obtained by Fudenberg and Harris (1992) do not coincide with the
stochastic replicator dynamics induced by (EW) in the presence of random distur-
bances and measurement noise – in contrast to the noiseless case where (EW) and
(RD) do coincide. As we mentioned above, this learning variant of the stochastic
replicator dynamics actually retains the rationality properties of the deterministic
system (EW)/(RD) without any caveats on the noise: dominated strategies become
extinct and strict Nash equilibria remain stochastically asymptotically stable with-
out any conditions on the perturbations’ magnitude. This shows that the origin
of the noise is crucial in the determination of the dynamics’ long-term properties:
whereas the “aggregate shocks” of evolutionary environments lead to rational be-
havior in a modified game, no such modifications are required when learning under
uncertainty.
1.2. Paper outline. In Section 2, we present our model for learning in the presence
of noise and we derive the system of coupled stochastic differential equations (SDEs)
that governs the evolution of the players’ mixed strategies. In Section 3, we show
that if the players use a smoothly decreasing learning parameter, then the learning
dynamics under study lead to no regret (a.s.), whatever the noise level. In Section
4, we investigate dominated strategies: we show that dominated strategies become
extinct (a.s.) and we derive an explicit bound for their extinction rate. Section 5
focuses on the dynamics’ long-term stability and convergence properties: we show
that a) stochastically (Lyapunov) stable states and states that attract trajectories
of play with positive probability are Nash equilibria; and b) strict Nash equilibria
are stochastically asymptotically stable, irrespective of the fluctuations’ magnitude.
1For a closely related model, see also Cominetti, Melo, and Sorin (2010).
2Khasminskii and Potsepun (2006) also consider a Stratonovich-based model while Vlasic
(2012) examines the case of random jumps incurred by catastrophic, earthquake-like events
3Whether the equilibria of the original game are themselves asymptotically stable, depends on
the intensity of the noise on different strategies and also on the exact way that the noise enters
the process (Mertikopoulos and Viossat, 2016).
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In Section 6, we provide an averaging principle for 2-player games in the spirit of
Hofbauer, Sorin, and Viossat (2009); thanks to this principle, we then show that
empirical distributions of play converge to Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games
(again, no matter the noise level). Finally, in Section 7, we discuss the relaxation of
some of the assumptions on the noise process – and, in particular, the independence
of the observation noise across players and strategies.
To streamline our presentation, we included several numerical illustrations in the
main text (Figs. 1 and 2) and we relegated the more convoluted proofs to a series
of appendices at the end.
2. The model
After a few preliminaries to set notation and terminology, this section focuses on
the basic properties of a broad class of reinforcement learning dynamics under noise
and uncertainty. In the noiseless, deterministic regime (Section 2.2), our model
essentially boils down to the class of dynamics recently studied by Mertikopoulos
and Sandholm (2016). The full stochastic framework (Section 2.3) is then obtained
by positing that the agents’ observations are perturbed at each moment in time by
a zero-mean stochastic process (an Itô diffusion).
2.1. Preliminaries.
Notation. If S = {sα}nα=1 is a finite set, the real vector space generated by S will be
denoted by RS and we will write {es}s∈S for its canonical basis; for concision, we
will also use α to refer interchangeably to α or sα, writing e.g. xα instead of xsα .
The set ∆(S) of probability measures on S will be identified with the n-dimensional
simplex ∆ = {x ∈ RS : ∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0} and the relative interior of ∆ will
be written ∆◦.
If {Sk}k∈N is a finite family of sets, we will use the shorthand (αk;α−k) for the
tuple (. . . , αk−1, αk, αk+1, . . . ) and we will write
∑k
α instead of
∑
α∈Sk . Finally, any
statement of the form f(t) = o(g(t)) for a stochastic process f should be interpreted
in the a.s. sense, i.e. “for every C > 0, there exists a.s. some (random) t0 such that
|f(t)| ≤ C |g(t)| for all t ≥ t0” – and likewise for the statement “f(t) = O(g(t))”.
Definitions from game theory. A finite game in normal form is a tuple G ≡ G(N ,A, u)
consisting of a) a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , N}; b) a finite set Ak of
actions (or pure strategies) per player k ∈ N ; and c) the players’ payoff func-
tions uk : A → R, where A ≡
∏
kAk denotes the set of all joint action profiles
(α1, . . . , αN ). The set of mixed strategies of player k is denoted by Xk ≡ ∆(Ak)
and the space X ≡∏k Xk of mixed strategy profiles x = (x1, . . . , xN ) will be called
the game’s strategy space. In this mixed context, the expected payoff of player k in
the strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X is
uk(x) =
∑1
α1
· · ·
∑N
αN
uk(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · · xN,αN , (2.1)
where, in a slight abuse of notation, uk(α1, . . . , αN ) denotes the payoff of player k
in the profile (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ A. Accordingly, the payoff corresponding to α ∈ Ak
in the mixed strategy profile x ∈ X is
vkα(x) ≡ uk(α;x−k) =
∑1
α1
· · ·
∑N
αN
uk(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · · δαk,α · · · xN,αN ,
(2.2)
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leading to the more concise expression
uk(x) =
∑k
α
xkαvkα(x) = 〈vk(x), xk〉 (2.3)
where vk(x) = (vkα(x))α∈Ak denotes the payoff vector of player k at x ∈ X .
2.2. The deterministic model. Our learning model will be based on the follow-
ing simple idea: the game’s players “score” their actions by keeping track of their
cumulative payoffs and then, at each moment t ≥ 0, they play an “approximate”
best response to this vector of performance scores (thus reinforcing the probability
of playing an action with a higher overall payoff). More precisely, following Mer-
tikopoulos and Sandholm (2016), this process can be described by the dynamics
yk(t) =
∫ t
0
vk(x(s)) ds,
xk(t) = Qk(ηk(t)yk(t)),
(RL)
where:
(1) the score vector yk(t) = (ykα(t))α∈Ak of player k ranks each strategy α ∈
Ak based on its cumulative payoff ykα(t) =
∫ t
0
vkα(x(s)) ds up to time t.
(2) Qk(yk) is a choice map which reinforces the strategies with the highest
scores (see below for a rigorous definition).
(3) ηk(t) > 0 is a learning parameter which can be tuned freely by each player.
Clearly, a natural choice for the “scores-to-strategies” map Qk would be to take
the arg max correspondence yk 7→ arg maxxk∈Xk 〈yk, xk〉, i.e. to greedily assign all
weight to the strategy (or strategies) with the highest score. However, since the
arg max operator is multi-valued (so each player would also need to employ some
tie-breaking rule to resolve ambiguities), we will focus on single-valued choice maps
of the general form
Qk(yk) = arg max
xk∈Xk
{〈yk, xk〉 − hk(xk)}, (2.4)
where the penalty function hk : Xk → R satisfies the following properties:
a) hk is continuous on Xk.
b) hk is smooth on the relative interior of every face of Xk.
c) hk is strongly convex on Xk, i.e. there exists some K > 0 such that
hk(txk + (1− t)x′k) ≤ thk(xk) + (1− t)hk(x′k)− 12Kt(1− t)‖x′k − xk‖2, (2.5)
for all xk, x′k ∈ Xk and for all t ∈ [0, 1].
This “softening” of the arg max operator has a long history in game theory and
optimization, and the induced map Qk is intimately related to the notion of soft-
max or perturbed/regularized best response maps; for an in-depth discussion, we
refer the reader to Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) and Mertikopoulos and Sand-
holm (2016). For our immediate purposes, the key observation is that (2.4) is a
strictly concave problem, so it admits a unique solution for every input vector yk.
Therefore, when the penalty term hk is small relative to yk, Qk(yk) can be seen
as a single-valued approximation of the standard best response correspondence
yk 7→ arg maxxk∈Xk 〈yk, xk〉.
Regarding the learning parameter ηk, its role in (RL) is to temper the growth
of the cumulative payoff vector yk(t) so as to allow the player to better explore
his strategies (instead of prematurely reinforcing one or another). In other words,
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ηk can be interpreted as an extrinsic weight that the player assigns to cumulative
observations of past payoffs.4 Accordingly, given that y(t) grows (at most) as O(t),
we will assume throughout that:
Assumption 1. ηk(t) is C1-smooth, nonincreasing and limt→∞ tηk(t) = +∞.
The decay rate of η(t) will play a crucial role when the players’ payoff observa-
tions are subject to stochastic perturbations, an issue that we will explore in detail
in later sections. For now, we turn to two representative examples of (RL):
Example 2.1. The prototype penalty function on the simplex is the Gibbs (negative)
entropy h(x) =
∑
α xα log xα which, after a standard calculation, yields the so-
called logit map:
Gα(y) =
exp(yα)∑
β exp(yβ)
. (2.6)
An easy differentiation then yields
x˙kα =
eykα y˙kα∑k
β e
ykβ
− e
ykα
∑k
β e
ykβ y˙kβ(∑k
β e
ykβ
)2 = xkα [vkα(x)−∑kβ xkβ vkβ(x)
]
, (RD)
which is simply the (multi-population) replicator equation of Taylor and Jonker
(1978) for population evolution under natural selection. For a more thorough treat-
ment of the links between logit choice and the replicator dynamics, see Hofbauer
et al. (2009), Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010), and references therein.
Example 2.2. As another example, consider the penalty function h(x) = 12
∑
α x
2
α.
This quadratic penalty function leads to the projected choice map
Π(y) = arg minx∈∆
{ 〈y, x〉 − 12 ‖x‖2 } = arg minx∈∆ ‖y − x‖2 , (2.7)
and, as was shown by Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016), the induced trajectories
x(t) = Π(y(t)) of (RL) satisfy the so-called projection dynamics
x˙kα =
{
vkα(x)− |supp(xk)|−1
∑
β∈supp(xk) vkβ(x) if xkα > 0,
0 otherwise,
(PD)
on an open dense set of times (in particular, except when the support of x(t)
changes). The dynamics (PD) were introduced in game theory by Friedman (1991)
as a geometric model of the evolution of play in population games; for a closely
related model (but with different long-term properties), see Nagurney and Zhang
(1997) and Lahkar and Sandholm (2008).
4The role of the learning parameter η(t) can also be linked to the vanishing step-size rules
that are used in the theory of stochastic approximation – see e.g. Benaïm (1999), Lamberton,
Pagès, and Tarrès (2004), Oyarzun and Ruf (2014) and references therein. The difference between
the two is that, in the theory of stochastic approximation, a variable step-size means that new
information enters the algorithm with decreasing weight; on the other hand, in our context, all
information is weighted evenly, but the aggregate information is weighted by η(t) to avoid extreme
behaviors.
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Related models. The reinforcement mechanism of (RL) is seen quite clearly in the
work of Vovk (1990) and Littlestone and Warmuth (1994) on multi-armed bandits.
Therein, the agent is faced with a repeated decision process (e.g. choosing a slot
machine in the eponymous problem) and, at each stage, he selects an action with
probability exponentially proportional to an estimate of said action’s cumulative
payoff up to that time. In this way, the mean dynamics of the agent’s learning
process boil down to the exponential learning scheme (EW) of Example 2.1 – itself
a special case of (RL).
Leslie and Collins (2005) and Coucheney, Gaujal, and Mertikopoulos (2015) also
considered a reinforcement learning process where players discount past observa-
tions by a constant multiplicative factor and then play a perturbed best response
to the resulting cumulative payoff vector – or estimate thereof. The mean dynamics
that describe this process in continuous time are then given by (RL) with constant
η and an additional adjustment term that accounts for the exponential discounting
of past observations. For a more detailed survey of the surrounding literature, we
refer the reader to Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and Mertikopoulos and Sandholm
(2016).
2.3. Learning in the presence of noise. A key assumption underlying the rein-
forcement learning scheme (RL) is that the players’ payoff observations are impervi-
ous to any sort of exogenous random noise. However, this assumption is rarely met
in practical applications of game-theoretic learning: for instance, in telecommuni-
cation networks and traffic engineering, signal strength and latency measurements
are constantly subject to stochastic fluctuations which introduce noise to the input
of any learning algorithm (Kang, Kelly, Lee, and Williams, 2009; Kelly, Maulloo,
and Tan, 1998). Thus, to account for the lack of accurate payoff information in
settings where uncertainty is an issue, we will consider the stochastically perturbed
reinforcement learning process:
dYkα = vkα(X) dt+ σkα(X) dWkα,
Xk = Qk(ηkYk),
(SRL)
where Wkα is a family of standard Wiener processes (assumed independent across
players and strategies) and the diffusion coefficients σkα : X → R (assumed Lips-
chitz) measure the strength of the noise process.
Intuitively, the random component of (SRL) means that the players’ observed
payoffs are only accurate up to an error term of the order of σkα, possibly de-
pending on the players’ mixed strategies but otherwise uncorrelated over players
and strategies.5 As such, (SRL) should be viewed as a special instance of the more
general case where observation errors exhibit correlations between different actions:
for instance, if each player’s action corresponds to a choice of route in a congestion
game, any two routes that overlap will exhibit such correlations. The impact of in-
cluding such correlations in our model is discussed at length in Section 7; however,
for simplicity, our analysis will be stated in the uncorrelated case.
5An alternative source of stochasticity could be any inherent randomness in the players’ payoffs
– for instance, if there is a random component to the players’ payoffs. A detailed analysis of this
case would require a careful reformulation of the underlying game which, for simplicity, we do not
attempt here; for a related treatment in an evolutionary context, see Mertikopoulos and Viossat
(2016).
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Regarding the existence and uniqueness of solutions to (SRL), Proposition B.1
in Appendix B shows that the players’ choice maps Qk are Lipschitz continuous,
so (SRL) admits a unique (strong) solution Y (t) for every initial condition Y (0).
Standard arguments can then be used to show that these solutions exist for all
time (a.s.), so the players’ mixed strategy profile X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)) is also fully
determined for all t ≥ 0. However, since this is a somewhat indirect description
of the evolution of X(t), our first task will be to derive the governing dynamics of
X(t) in the form of a stochastic differential equation stated directly on X .
For simplicity, we only present here the special case where each player’s penalty
function is of the separable form:
hk(xk) =
∑k
α
θk(xkα) (2.8)
for some strongly convex kernel function θk ∈ C0[0, 1] ∩ C3(0, 1]. We then get:
Proposition 2.1. Let X(t) be an orbit of (SRL) in X and let I be a random open
interval such that supp(X(t)) remains constant over I. Then, for all t ∈ I, X(t)
satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dXkα =
ηk
θ′′kα
[
vkα −Θ′′k
∑
β
vkβ
/
θ′′kβ
]
dt (2.9a)
+
ηk
θ′′kα
[
σkα dWkα −Θ′′k
∑
β
σkβ
/
θ′′kβ dWkβ
]
(2.9b)
+
η˙k
ηk
1
θ′′kα
[
θ′kα −Θ′′k
∑
β
θ′kβ
/
θ′′kβ
]
dt (2.9c)
− 1
2
1
θ′′kα
[
θ′′′kαU
2
kα −Θ′′k
∑
β
θ′′′kβ/θ
′′
kβ U
2
kβ
]
dt, (2.9d)
where all summations are taken over β ∈ supp(Xk) and:
a) θ′kα = θ
′
k(Xkα), θ
′′
kα = θ
′′
k(Xkα), θ
′′′
kα = θ
′′′
k (Xkα),
b) Θ′′k =
(∑
β 1/θ
′′
kβ
)−1
,
c) U2kα =
(
ηk
θ′′kα
)2 [
σ2kα
(
1−Θ′′k
/
θ′′kα
)2
+
∑
β 6=α
(
Θ′′k
/
θ′′kβ
)2
σ2kβ
]
.
In particular, if limz→0+ θ′k(z) = −∞ for all k ∈ N , X(t) is an ordinary (strong)
solution of (2.9); otherwise, X(t) satisfies (2.9) on a random open dense subset of
[0,∞).
The proof of Proposition 2.1 is a simple but interesting application of Itô’s for-
mula; to streamline our presentation, we relegate it to Appendix A and we focus
here on some remarks and examples (see also Fig. 1 for some sample trajectories of
the process):
Remark 2.1. Even though the dynamics (2.9) appear quite convoluted, each of the
constituent terms (2.9a)–(2.9d) admits a relatively simple interpretation:
a) The term (2.9a) drives the process in the case σ = 0, η = constant. These are
the deterministic dynamics studied by Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016)
and correspond to learning in settings with no uncertainty.
b) The diffusion term (2.9b) reflects the direct impact of the noise on (SRL).
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c) The term (2.9c) is due to the variability of the players’ learning rate η so
its impact on (2.9) vanishes if η(t) → 0 sufficiently fast. On the other hand,
this term obviously persists even if there is no noise in the players’ learning
process.
d) Finally, the term (2.9d) is the Itô correction induced on Xk through (SRL)
due to the non-anticipative nature of the Itô integral.6 Importantly, this term
depends on η but not η˙, so it does not vanish for constant η.
Example 2.3. As we saw in Example 2.1, the replicator dynamics (RD) correspond
to the entropic kernel θ(x) = x log x. In this case, (2.9) leads to the following
stochastic variant of the replicator dynamics:
dXkα = ηkXkα
[
vkα −
∑k
β
Xkβ vkβ
]
dt
+ ηkXkα
[
σkα dWkα −
∑k
β
σkβXkβ dWkβ
]
+
η˙k
ηk
Xkα
[
logXkα −
∑k
β
Xkβ logXkβ
]
dt
+
η2k
2
Xkα
[
σ2kα(1− 2Xkα)−
∑k
β
σ2kβXkβ (1− 2Xkβ)
]
dt.
(SRD)
For constant η, (SRD) is simply the stochastic replicator dynamics of exponential
learning studied by Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010). As such, (SRD) should
be contrasted to the evolutionary replicator dynamics with aggregate shocks of Fu-
denberg and Harris (1992):
dXkα = Xkα
[
vkα −
∑k
β
Xkβvkβ
]
dt
+Xkα
[
σkαdWkα −
∑k
β
σkβXkβ dWkβ
]
−Xkα
[
σ2kαXkα −
∑k
β
σ2kβX
2
kβ
]
dt,
(ASRD)
where Xkα denotes the population share of the α-th genotype of species k in a
multi-species environment, vkα represents its reproductive fitness, and the noise
coefficients σkα measure the impact of random weather-like effects on population
evolution.7
Besides the absence of the learning rate η, the fundamental difference between
(SRD) and (ASRD) is in their Itô correction: as we shall see in what follows, this
term leads to a drastically different long-term behavior and highlights an important
contrast between learning and evolution in the presence of noise.
6If (SRL) had been formulated as a Stratonovich equation, (2.9d) would vanish; however, the
future-anticipating nature of the Stratonovich integral (van Kampen, 1981) is not well-suited for
our purposes.
7For a comprehensive account of the literature surrounding (ASRD), see Hofbauer and Imhof
(2009), Mertikopoulos and Viossat (2016), and references therein. In addition to the works
mentioned above, Khasminskii and Potsepun (2006) study a Stratonovich-based formulation of
(ASRD) while Vlasic (2012) also considers random jumps induced by discontinuous, earthquake-
like events.
LEARNING IN GAMES WITH NOISY PAYOFF OBSERVATIONS 11
(�� �)
(�� �)
(�� �)
(�� �)
��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���
���
���
���
���
���
���
��
� �
����� ����������� ������������� ��������
(�� �)
(�� �)
(�� �)
(�� �)
��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���
���
���
���
���
���
���
��
� �
����� ��������� ������������� ��������
Figure 1. Evolution of play under (SRL) with logit (left) and choice maps
(right) for a 2 × 2 congestion game (Nash equilibria are depicted in red; for
the game’s payoffs, see the vertex labels). For comparison purposes, we took
σkα = 1 for all α ∈ Ak, k = 1, 2, and we used the same Wiener process
realization in both cases: the orbits of projected reinforcement learning attain
the boundary of X and converge to Nash equilibrium much faster than in the
case of exponential learning.
Example 2.4. In the case of the projected reinforcement learning scheme (PD),
substituting θ(x) = x2/2 in (2.9) yields the stochastic projection dynamics:
dXkα =
[
vkα − |supp(Xk)|−1
∑
β∈supp(Xk)
vkβ
]
dt
+
[
σkα dWkα − |supp(Xk)|−1
∑
β∈supp(Xk)
σkβ dWkβ
]
+
η˙k
ηk
[
Xkα − |supp(Xk)|−1
]
dt.
(SPD)
There are two important qualitative differences between (SRD) and (SPD): first,
(SRD) holds for all t ≥ 0 whereas (SPD) describes the solution orbits of (SRL)
only on intervals over which the support of X(t) remains constant. Second, the
projection mapping Π of (2.7) is piecewise linear, so there is no Itô correction in
(SPD); accordingly, the distinction between Itô and Stratonovich perturbations
becomes void in the context of (SPD).
3. Regret minimization
We begin our rationality analysis in the case where there is a single player whose
payoffs are determined by the state of his environment – which, in turn, may evolve
arbitrarily over time (including adversarially if the player is playing against an
opponent).
More precisely, consider a decision process where, at each t ≥ 0, the player
chooses an action from a finite set A according to some mixed strategy x(t) ∈ X ≡
∆(A) and his expected payoff is determined by the (a priori unknown) payoff vector
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v(t) = (vα(t))α∈A of stage t. In this context, the performance of a dynamic strategy
x(t) can be measured by comparing the player’s (expected) cumulative payoff to
the payoff that he could have obtained if the state of nature were known in advance
and the player had best-responded to it; specifically, the player’s cumulative regret
at time t is defined as
Reg(t) = max
α∈A
∫ t
0
vα(s) ds−
∫ t
0
〈v(s), x(s)〉 ds, (3.1)
and we say that a strategy x(t) is consistent if it leads to no (average) regret, i.e.
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
Reg(t) ≤ 0 (a.s.), (3.2)
or, equivalently:
Reg(t) = o(t) as t→∞. (3.3)
The notion of consistency presented above is commonly referred to as exter-
nal or universal consistency and was originally introduced by Hannan (1957) in a
discrete-time context (for a detailed overview, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998),
Shalev-Shwartz (2011) and references therein). There, the agent is assumed to
receive a payoff vector vn ∈ RA at each stage n ∈ N and, observing the past real-
izations v1, . . . , vn−1, he chooses an action αn ∈ A according to some probability
distribution xn ∈ ∆(A). The strategy xn is then said to be externally consistent
if, on average, it earns more than any action (or expert suggestion) α ∈ A; in other
words, the no-regret criterion (3.2) is simply the continuous-time analogue of the
standard definition of external consistency.
With this in mind, the main question that we seek to address here is whether
the perturbed reinforcement learning process (SRL) is consistent. To make this
precise, we will focus on the unilateral process
dYα(t) = vα(t) dt+ σα(t) dWα(t),
X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)),
(SRL-U)
where v(t) is a locally integrable stream of payoff vectors, W (t) is a Wiener process
in RA and the noise coefficients σα (assumed continuous and bounded) represent
the error in the player’s payoff observations. In the deterministic case (σ = 0), Sorin
(2009) proved that the unilateral variant of (EW) is consistent, a result which was
recently extended by Kwon and Mertikopoulos (2014) to the more general setting
of (RL). Below, we show that this learning process remains consistent even when
the player’s payoff observations are subject to arbitrarily high observation noise:
Theorem 3.1. Assume that (SRL-U) is run with learning parameter η(t) satisfying
limt→∞ η(t) = 0 (in addition to Assumption 1) and initial bias Y (0) = 0. Then,
(SRL-U) is consistent and it enjoys the cumulative regret bound:
Reg(t) ≤ Ω
η(t)
+ σ2max
|A|
2K
∫ t
0
η(s) ds+O(σmax
√
t log log t), (3.4)
where Ω = max{h(x) − h(x′) : x, x′ ∈ X}, σmax = supt maxβ σβ(t) and K is the
strong convexity constant of the player’s penalty function h.
Remark. The assumption Y (0) = 0 is only made for simplicity: the policy (SRL-U)
is consistent for any initial score vector Y (0) but the corresponding regret guarantee
is a bit more cumbersome to write down.
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The basic idea of our proof will be to compare the cumulative payoff of the policy
(SRL-U) up to time t to that of an arbitrary test strategy p ∈ X . To that end,
we will examine how far the induced trajectory of play X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)) can
stray from p; however, since X(t) is defined via the cumulative payoff process Y (t),
we will carry out this comparison between p and Y (t) directly using the so-called
Fenchel coupling :
F (x, y) = h(x) + h∗(y)− 〈y, x〉 , (3.5)
where
h∗(y) = max
x∈X
{〈y, x〉 − h(x)} (3.6)
denotes the convex conjugate of h (Rockafellar, 1970).8 By Fenchel’s inequality
(Rockafellar, 1970), F (x, y) is non-negative in both arguments, so it provides a
“congruity” measure between x and y. With this in mind, our proof strategy will
be to express the player’s regret with respect to a test strategy p ∈ X in terms of
F (p, Y (t)) and then show that the latter grows sublinearly in t.
The details of the proof are presented in Appendix A and rely on Itô’s lemma and
the law of the iterated logarithm (which is used to control the impact of the noise
on the agent’s learning process). For now, we focus on some aspects of Theorem
3.1 and the regret bound (3.4):
Remark 3.1 (The role of η). It is important to note that the second term of (3.4)
becomes linear in t when the player’s learning parameter η is constant, explaining
in this way the requirement that η(t) → 0 as t → ∞. On the other hand, this
requirement can be dropped in the noiseless case: when σ = 0, the guarantee
(3.4) reduces to Ω/η(t), so (SRL-U) remains consistent even for constant η – a
fact which was first observed by Sorin (2009) in the context of (EW) and Kwon
and Mertikopoulos (2014) for (RL). In the presence of noise, we conjecture that
(SRL-U) may lead to positive regret with positive probability for constant η but
we have not been able to prove this.
The form of the bound (3.4) also highlights a trade-off between more aggres-
sive learning rates (slowly decaying η) and the noise affecting the player’s payoff
observations. Specifically, the first (deterministic) term of (3.4) is decreasing in η
while the second one (which is due to all the noise) is increasing in η;9 as a re-
sult, in the absence of noise (σ = 0), it is better to use a large, constant η rather
than letting η(t) → 0, but this might lead to disastrous results under uncertainty.
Shalev-Shwartz (2011) draws a similar conclusion for the discrete-time analogue of
(RL) known as online mirror descent (OMD); in this way, discretization and ran-
dom payoff disturbances seem to have comparably adverse effects on the agent’s
learning process.
The above considerations can be illustrated more explicitly by choosing η(t) =
t−γ for some γ ∈ (0, 1); in this case, Theorem 3.1 yields the regret bounds:
8The terminology “Fenchel coupling” is due to Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) and reflects
the fact that (3.5) collects all the terms of Fenchel’s inequality.
9The last term of (3.4) is also due to the noise, but it does not otherwise depend on η(t).
14 M. BRAVO AND P. MERTIKOPOULOS
Corollary 3.2. Assume that (SRL-U) is run with learning rate η(t) ∼ t−γ for
some γ ∈ (0, 1). Then:
Reg(t) =

O (t1−γ) if 0 < γ < 12 ,
O (√t log log t) if γ = 12 ,
O (tγ) if 12 < γ < 1.
(3.7)
Proof. Simply note that tmax{γ,1−γ} is the dominant term in (3.4) for all γ 6=
1/2. Otherwise, for γ = 1/2, the first two terms of (3.4) are both O(√t) and are
dominated by the third. 
Remark 3.2 (Links with vanishingly smooth fictitious play). We close this section by
discussing the links of (SRL-U) with the vanishingly smooth fictitious play process
that was recently examined by Benaïm and Faure (2013) in a discrete-time setting.
Specifically, by interpreting t−1
∫ t
0
v(s) ds as the payoff that a player obtains in a
2-player game against his opponent’s empirical frequency of play (cf. Section 6),
the strategy
x(t) = Q
(
η(t)
∫ t
0
v(s) ds
)
= Q
(
tη(t) · t−1
∫ t
0
v(s) ds
)
(3.8)
can be viewed as a “vanishingly smooth” best response to the empirical distribution
of play of one’s opponent.10 As such, (SRL-U) can be seen as a stochastically
perturbed variant of vanishingly smooth fictitious play in continuous time, in which
case Corollary 3.2 provides the continuous-time, stochastic analogue of Theorem 1.8
of Benaïm and Faure (2013).
4. Extinction of dominated strategies
A fundamental rationality requirement for any game-theoretic learning process
is the elimination of suboptimal, dominated strategies. Formally, given a finite
game G ≡ G(N ,A, u), we say that pk ∈ Xk is dominated by p′k ∈ Xk (and we write
pk ≺ p′k) if
〈vk(x), pk〉 < 〈vk(x), p′k〉 for all x ∈ X . (4.1)
Strategies that are iteratively dominated, undominated, or iteratively undominated
are defined similarly; also, for pure strategies α, β ∈ Ak, we obviously have α ≺ β
if and only if
vkα(x) < vkβ(x) for all x ∈ X . (4.2)
With this in mind, given a trajectory of play x(t), t ≥ 0, we will say that a pure
strategy α ∈ Ak becomes extinct along x(t) if xkα(t)→ 0 as t→∞. More generally,
following Samuelson and Zhang (1992), we will say that the mixed strategy pk ∈ Xk
becomes extinct along x(t) if min{xkα(t) : α ∈ supp(pk)} → 0; otherwise, pk is said
to survive.
In the case of perfect payoff observations, Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016)
showed that dominated strategies become extinct under the general reinforcement
learning dynamics (RL), thus extending earlier results for the replicator dynamics
(for an overview, see Viossat, 2015). Under noise and uncertainty however, the
situation is a bit more complex: in the replicator dynamics with aggregate shocks
10It is “smooth” because the player is employing a regularized best response map (as opposed
to a hard argmax correspondence), and it is “vanishingly smooth” because the factor tη(t) hardens
to ∞ as t→∞ (for a more detailed discussion, see Benaïm and Faure, 2013).
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(ASRD), Cabrales (2000), Imhof (2005) and Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) provided
a set of sufficient conditions on the intensity of the noise that guarantee the elim-
ination of dominated strategies; on the other hand, Mertikopoulos and Moustakas
(2010) showed that the noisy replicator dynamics (SRD) eliminate all strategies
that are not iteratively undominated, with no conditions on the noise level.
As we show below, this unconditional elimination result is a consequence of
the core reinforcement principle behind (RL) and it extends to the entire class of
learning dynamics covered by (SRL):
Theorem 4.1. Let X(t) be a solution orbit of (SRL). If pk ∈ Xk is dominated
(even iteratively), then it becomes extinct along X(t) almost surely.
The basic idea of our proof is to show that the Itô process X(t) has a dominant
drift term that pushes it away from dominated strategies. However, given the
complicated form of the (non-autonomous) dynamics (2.9), we do so by using the
Fenchel coupling (3.5) to relate the evolution of the generating process Yk(t) to pk.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Suppose pk ≺ p′k so that 〈vk(x), p′k − pk〉 ≥ mk for some
mk > 0 and for all x ∈ X . Then, if Y (t) is a solution orbit of (SRL), we get:
d 〈Yk, p′k − pk〉 = 〈dYk, p′k − pk〉 = 〈vk, p′k − pk〉 dt+
∑k
β
(p′kβ − pkβ)σkβ dWkβ
≥ mk dt+
∑k
β
(p′kβ − pkβ)σkβ dWkβ , (4.3)
or, equivalently:
〈Yk(t), p′k − pk〉 ≥ ck +mkt+ ξk(t), (4.4)
where ck = 〈Yk(0), pk − p′k〉 and
ξk(t) =
∑k
β
(pkβ − p′kβ)
∫ t
0
σkβ(X(s)) dWkβ(s). (4.5)
Consider now the rate-adjusted “cross-coupling”
Vk(yk) = η
−1
k [Fk(pk, ηkyk)− Fk(p′k, ηkyk)]
= η−1k [hk(pk)− hk(p′k)]− 〈yk, pk − p′k〉 , (4.6)
with Fk defined as in (3.5). Then, by substituting (4.4) in (4.6) and recalling that
Fk(p
′
k, yk) ≥ 0, we obtain:
Fk(pk, ηkYk) ≥ hk(pk)− hk(p′k) + ηk · [ck +mkt+ ξk(t)] . (4.7)
To proceed, Lemma B.4 shows that mkt + ξk(t) ∼ mkt (a.s.), so the RHS of (4.7)
tends to infinity as t→∞ on account of the fact that tηk(t)→ +∞ (cf. Assumption
1). In turn, this gives Fk(pk, ηk(t)Yk(t)) → +∞, so pk becomes extinct along
X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)) by virtue of Proposition B.1. Finally, our claim for iteratively
dominated strategies follows by induction on the rounds of elimination of dominated
strategies – cf. Cabrales (2000, Proposition 1A). 
Theorem 4.1 shows that dominated strategies become extinct under (SRL) but
it does not give any information on the rate of extinction – or how probable it is
to observe a dominated strategy above a given level at some t ≥ 0. To address
this issue, we provide two results below: Proposition 4.2 describes the long-term
decay rate of dominated strategies and provides a “large deviations” bound for
the probability of observing a dominated strategy above a given level at time t ≥
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0. Subsequently, in Proposition 4.3 we estimate the expected time it takes for
a dominated strategy to drop below a given level. For simplicity, we present our
results in the case where the players’ choice maps are derived from separable penalty
functions as in (2.8); again, proofs are relegated to Appendix A:
Proposition 4.2. Let α ∈ Ak be dominated by β ∈ Ak and assume that the choice
map of player k is generated by a separable penalty function of the form (2.8) with
limx→0+ θ′k(x) = −∞. Then, for all δ, ε > 0 and for all large enough t, we have:
Xkα(t) ≤ φk
[
Ck − ηk(t)
(
mkt− 2(1 + ε)σαβ
√
t log log t
)]
(a.s.) (4.8)
and
P (Xkα(t) > δ) ≤ 1
2
erfc
[
1
2σαβ
(
mk
√
t− Ck − θ
′
k(δ)
ηk(t)
√
t
)]
(4.9)
where:
a) erfc(z) = 2√
pi
∫∞
z
e−t
2
dt is the complementary error function.
b) φk = (θ′k)
−1 (note that limz→−∞ φk(z) = 0 by assumption).
c) mk = minx∈X {vkβ(x)−vkα(x)} > 0 is the minimum payoff difference between
α and β.
d) σ2αβ =
1
2 maxx∈X
{
σ2kα(x) + σ
2
kβ(x)
}
> 0.
e) Ck is a constant that depends only on the initial conditions of (SRL).
Proposition 4.3. With notation as in Proposition 4.2, assume that (SRL) is run
with constant learning rates ηk and noisy observations with constant variance. If
τδ = inf{t > 0 : Xkα(t) ≤ δ}, then:
E[τδ] ≤
[
Ck − θ′k(δ)
]
+
ηkmk
. (4.10)
Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 are our main results concerning the rate of elimination
of dominated strategies under uncertainty, so a few remarks are in order:
Remark 4.1 (Asymptotics versus mean behavior). Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 capture
complementary aspects of the statistics of the extinction rate of dominated strate-
gies under (SRL). For instance, (4.8) describes the asymptotic rate of elimination
of dominated strategies but it does not provide an estimate of how much time must
pass until this rate becomes relevant. On the other hand, the bound (4.10) esti-
mates the mean time it takes for a dominated strategy to fall below a given level;
however, in contrast to (4.9), it does not describe how probable it is to observe
deviations from this mean.
Remark 4.2 (Comparison with the noiseless case). When σ = 0, the decay estimate
(4.8) boils down to φk[Ck −mkηk(t)t], a bound which recovers the results of Mer-
tikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) for the deterministic dynamics (RL). Thus, even
though the noise may initially mask the fact that a strategy is dominated, Proposi-
tion 4.2 shows that the long-run behavior of (SRL) and (RL) is the same as far as
dominated strategies are concerned. This is in contrast with the aggregate-shocks
dynamics (ASRD) where, even if a dominated strategy becomes extinct, its rate
of elimination is different to leading order than in the noiseless case (Imhof, 2005,
Theorem 3.1).
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Remark 4.3 (The role of η). The estimate (4.8) shows that running (SRL) with
large, constant η leads to a much faster rate of extinction of dominated strategies.
In particular, recalling that erfc(t) ∼ pi−1/2t−1e−t2 as t → ∞, the bound (4.9)
becomes:
P(Xkα(t) > δ) = O
(
t−1/2 exp
(
− m
2
kt
2σ2αβ
))
, (4.11)
up to a subleading term of the order of O(1/η2k(t)) in the exponent. Thus, even
though the leading behavior of (4.9) is not affected by the player’s choice of learning
parameter, the subleading term is minimized for large, constant η so the asymptotic
bound (4.11) becomes tighter in that case.
We thus observe an important contrast between regret minimization and the
elimination of dominated strategies: whereas the optimal regret guarantee of The-
orem 3.1 is achieved for η(t) ∝ 1/√t, the asymptotic extinction rate of dominated
strategies is much faster for constant η. The reason for this disparity is that higher
values of η reinforce consistent payoff differences and therefore eliminate dominated
strategies faster (independently of the noise level). On the other hand, to attain
a no-regret state, players must be careful not to make too many mistakes in the
presence of noise, so a more conservative choice of η is warranted.
5. Long-term stability and convergence analysis
We now turn to the long-term stability and convergence properties of the dy-
namics (SRL) with respect to equilibrium play. To that end, recall first that x∗ ∈ X
is a Nash equilibrium of G ≡ G(N ,A, u) if it is unilaterally stable for all players,
i.e.
uk(x
∗) ≥ uk(xk, x∗−k) for all xk ∈ Xk, k ∈ N , (5.1)
or, equivalently:
vkα(x
∗) ≥ vkβ(x∗) for all k ∈ N and for all α ∈ supp(x∗k), β ∈ Ak. (5.2)
Strict equilibria are defined by requiring that (5.1) hold as a strict inequality for all
xk 6= x∗k; obviously, such equilibria are also pure in the sense that they correspond
to pure strategy profiles in A = ∏kAk (i.e. vertices of X ).
In the noiseless case (σ = 0) with constant learning rates (η˙ = 0), Mertikopoulos
and Sandholm (2016) recently showed that the deterministic dynamics (RL) exhibit
the following properties with respect to Nash equilibria of G:
a) If a solution orbit of (RL) converges to x∗, then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
b) If x∗ ∈ X is (Lyapunov) stable, then it is also a Nash equilibrium.
c) Strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable in (RL).
In turn, these properties are generalizations of the long-term stability and conver-
gence properties of the (multi-population) replicator dynamics – sometimes referred
to as the “folk theorem” of evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998,
2003). That being said, the situation is quite different in the presence of noise: for
instance, interior Nash equilibria are not even traps (almost sure rest points) of the
stochastic reinforcement learning dynamics (SRL), so the ordinary (deterministic)
definitions of stability and convergence no longer apply. Instead, in the context of
stochastic differential equations, Lyapunov and asymptotic stability are defined as
follows (Khasminskii, 2012):
Definition 5.1. Let x∗ ∈ X . We will say that:
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(1) x∗ is stochastically (Lyapunov) stable under (SRL) if, for every ε > 0 and
for every neighborhood U0 of x∗ in X , there exists a neighborhood U ⊆ U0
of x∗ such that
P(X(t) ∈ U0 for all t ≥ 0) ≥ 1− ε, (5.3)
whenever X(0) ∈ U .
(2) x∗ is stochastically asymptotically stable under (SRL) if it is stochastically
stable and attracting: for every ε > 0 and for every neighborhood U0 of x∗
in X , there exists a neighborhood U ⊆ U0 of x∗ such that
P (X(t) ∈ U0 for all t ≥ 0 and limt→∞X(t) = x∗) ≥ 1− ε, (5.4)
whenever X(0) ∈ U .
In the evolutionary setting of the stochastic replicator dynamics with aggre-
gate shocks, Imhof (2005) and Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) showed that strict Nash
equilibria are stochastically asymptotically stable under (ASRD) provided that the
variability of the shocks across different strategies is small enough. More recently,
in a learning context, Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010) showed that the same
holds for the stochastic replicator dynamics (SRD) of exponential learning (with
constant η), irrespective of the variance of the observation noise. However, this
last result relies heavily on the specific properties of the logit map (2.6) and the
infinitesimal generator of (SRD).
In our case, the convoluted (and non-autonomous) form of the stochastic dy-
namics (2.9) complicates things considerably, so such an approach is not possible –
especially with regards to finding a local stochastic Lyapunov function for the dy-
namical system (2.9) that governs the evolution of X(t). Nonetheless, by working
directly with (SRL), we obtain the following general result:
Theorem 5.2. Let X(t) be a solution orbit of (SRL) and let x∗ ∈ X . Then:
(1) If P (limt→∞X(t) = x∗) > 0, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
(2) If x∗ is stochastically (Lyapunov) stable, it is also Nash.
(3) If x∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, it is stochastically asymptotically
stable under (SRL).
The fist ingredient of our proof (presented in detail in Appendix A) is to show
that if the process X(t) remains in the vicinity of x∗ ∈ X for all t ≥ 0 with positive
probability, then x∗ must be a Nash equilibrium. This is formalized in the following
proposition (which is of independent interest):
Proposition 5.3. With notation as in Theorem 5.2, assume that every neighbor-
hood U of x∗ in X admits with positive probability a solution orbit X(t) of (SRL)
such that X(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0. Then, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If x∗ is not Nash, we must have vkα(x∗) < vkβ(x∗) for some player k ∈ N
and for some α ∈ supp(x∗k), β ∈ Ak. On that account, let U be a sufficiently small
neighborhood of x∗ in X such that vkβ(x)− vkα(x) ≥ mk for some mk > 0 and for
all x ∈ U . Then, conditioning on the positive probability event that there exists an
orbit X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)) of (SRL) that is contained in U for all t ≥ 0, we have:
dYkα − dYkβ = (vkα(X)− vkβ(X)) dt+ σkα dWkα − σkβ dWkβ
≤ −mk dt− dξk, (5.5)
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where ξk(t) =
∫ t
0
σkβ(X(s)) dWkβ(s) −
∫ t
0
σkα(X(s)) dWkα(s). Since the diffusion
coefficients σ are bounded, the process ξk(t) will grow at most as O(
√
t log log t),
so we get ξk(t) + mkt ∼ mkt (for a precise statement, see Lemma B.4). Thus, on
account of Assumption 1 for ηk(t), we obtain:
ηk(t) ·
[
Ykα(t)− Ykβ(t)
] ≤ −mkt+ ξk(t)
t
· ηk(t)t→ −∞, (5.6)
The above shows that the score difference between α and β grows to −∞, so Xkα(t)
tends to zero as t → ∞ (Proposition B.1). This contradicts the assumption that
X(t) ∈ U for all t (recall that α ∈ supp(x∗k)), so x∗ must be a Nash equilibrium of
G. 
With Proposition 5.3 at hand, we are left to show that strict equilibria are
stochastically asymptotically stable under (SRL). This is carried out in Appendix
A by showing that a) trajectories that remain close to a strict equilibrium are
eventually attracted to it (because it is locally dominant); and b) that this occurs
with controllably high probability (a result which is harder to establish and which
relies on an application of Girsanov’s theorem to estimate the probability that a
Brownian motion with positive drift attains a given negative level in finite time).
We close this section with a few remarks on Theorem 5.2:
Remark 5.1 (Convergence rates and the role of η). By reasoning as in Proposition
4.2, it is also possible to show that the rate of convergence of (SRL) to strict equi-
libria increases with the players’ learning parameter η. As in the case of dominated
strategies, the reason for this is that players experience a consistent payoff difference
in favor of their equilibrium strategy when close to a strict equilibrium, and this
difference (which is reflected in the score process Y (t)) is heightened by η. In this
regard, convergence to a strict equilibrium seems to be somewhat antagonistic to
attaining a no-regret state in the presence of noise: the regret guarantee (3.4) is op-
timized for η(t) ∝ t−1/2 while the dynamics’ rate of convergence to strict equilibria
is faster for large, constant η.
Remark 5.2. By considering the modified game G˜ with noise-adjusted payoff func-
tions v˜kα(x) = vkα(x)− 12σ2kα, the reasoning in the proof of Theorem 5.2 yields an
alternative proof of the stability and convergence results of Hofbauer and Imhof
(2009) for the replicator dynamics with aggregate shocks (ASRD).
6. Time averages in 2-player games
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the time averages
X¯(t) =
1
t
∫ t
0
X(s) ds, (6.1)
and we establish an averaging principle for (SRL) in 2-player games. Our analysis is
motivated by the original deterministic results of Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) and
Hofbauer et al. (2009) who showed that X¯(t) converges to Nash equilibrium under
the replicator dynamics whenever lim inft→∞Xkα(t) > 0 for all α ∈ Ak, k = 1, 2.
More recently, Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) proved a version of this result
for arbitrary regularized best response maps (always in a deterministic setting),
while Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) showed that time-averages of the aggregate-shocks
replicator dynamics (ASRD) converge to the Nash set of a modified game.
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Our main result here is that the averaging principle of Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1998) extends to the perturbed reinforcement learning scheme (SRL), even in the
presence of arbitrarily large payoff observation errors:
Theorem 6.1. Let G be a 2-player game and let X(t) be a solution orbit of the
stochastic dynamics (SRL). If the players’ score differences Ykα(t) − Ykβ(t) grow
sublinearly with t for all α, β ∈ Ak, k = 1, 2, then the time-averaged process X¯(t)
converges almost surely to the set of Nash equilibria of G.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Pick α, β ∈ Ak. Then, by the definition of (SRL), we get:
Ykα(t)− Ykβ(t) = Ykα(0)− Ykβ(0) +
∫ t
0
[vkα(X(s))− vkβ(X(s))] ds
+
∫ t
0
σkα(X(s)) dWkα(s)−
∫ t
0
σkβ(X(s)) dWkβ(s)
= ck + ξk(t) + t
[
vkα(X¯(t))− vkβ(X¯(t))
]
, (6.2)
where ck = Ykα(0) − Ykβ(0), ξk(t) denotes the martingale part of (6.2) and we
have used the fact that vk(x) is linear in x (and not only multilinear). Since ξk(t)
is subleading in (6.2) with respect to t (cf. Lemma B.4 for a precise statement),
dividing by t yields:
lim
t→∞
[
vkα(X¯(t))− vkβ(X¯(t))
]
= 0 (a.s.), (6.3)
so vkα(x∗) = vkβ(x∗) whenever x∗ is an ω-limit of X¯(t). This shows that any ω-
limit of X¯(t) is a Nash equilibrium, and since the ω-set of X¯(t) is nonempty (by
compactness of X ), our claim follows. 
In the case of (EW)/(RD), the sublinear growth requirement for Ykα−Ykβ boils
down to the permanency condition lim inft→∞Xkα(t) > 0, so we recover the original
result of Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998). Other than that however, the applicability
of Theorem 6.1 is limited by the growth requirement for Ykα(t) − Ykβ(t). The
following proposition (whose proof can be found in Appendix A) shows that this
condition always holds in 2-player zero-sum games under the additional assumption
that limt→∞ ηk(t) = 0:
Proposition 6.2. Let G be a 2-player zero-sum game with an interior Nash equi-
librium, and assume that (SRL) is run with ηk(t) satisfying limt→∞ ηk(t) = 0 (in
addition to Assumption 1). Then, the time average of (SRL) converges to the set
of Nash equilibria of G (a.s.).
Proposition 6.2 is reminiscent of Theorem 3.1 on the no-regret properties of
(SRL) in that both results require a vanishing learning parameter. In the noiseless
regime however (σ = 0), this is not the case: in the replicator dynamics (which
correspond to (EW) with η = 1), the conclusions of Proposition 6.2 still hold
essentially verbatim (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Intuitively, the reason for this
is that time-averaged replicator orbits exhibit the same long-term behavior as the
(deterministic) best response dynamics of Gilboa and Matsui (1991):
x˙k ∈ brk(x)− xk, (BRD)
where brk(x) ≡ arg maxx′k∈Xk〈vk(x), x′k〉 denotes the standard (non-regularized)
best response correspondence of player k. Thus, given that the dynamics (BRD)
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(b) Distribution of time averages at time T .
Figure 2. Time averages of (SRL) with logit best responses in a game
of Matching Pennies (as in Fig. 1, Nash equilibria are depicted in red and
the game’s payoff’s are displayed inline; for benchmarking purposes, we also
took σkα = 1 for all α ∈ Ak, k = 1, 2). Fig. 2(a) shows the evolution of a
sample trajectory and its time average; in Fig. 2(b), we show a density plot
of the distribution of 104 time-averaged trajectories for different values of the
integration horizon T . In tune with Proposition 6.2, we see that time averages
converge to the game’s Nash equilibrium.
converge to equilibrium in zero-sum games, the same must also hold for the time
averages of (RD).
More precisely, Hofbauer et al. (2009) showed that the ω-limit set Ω of time-
averaged solutions of (RD) is internally chain transitive (ICT) under (BRD), i.e.
any two points in Ω may be joined by a piecewise continuous “chain” of arbitrarily
long orbit segments of (BRD) in Ω broken by arbitrarily small jump discontinu-
ities.11 Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) subsequently established a similar
averaging principle linking the deterministic reinforcement learning scheme (RL)
to (BRD). Importantly, as we show below, the stochastic dynamics (SRL) share
the same connection to the deterministic best response dynamics (BRD), despite
all the noise:
Theorem 6.3. Let X(t) be a solution orbit of (SRL) for a 2-player game G. Then,
the ω-limit set of X¯(t) is internally chain transitive under the deterministic best
response dynamics (BRD).
Proof. Our proof follows the approach of Hofbauer et al. (2009) and is presented
in detail in Appendix A. 
Thanks to Theorem 6.3, several conclusions of Hofbauer et al. (2009) for 2-player
games can be readily generalized to the full stochastic setting of (SRL) simply by
exploiting the properties of the deterministic dynamics (BRD):
11In particular, ICT sets are invariant, connected and have no proper attractors; for a full
development, see Benaïm, Hofbauer, and Sorin, 2005).
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(1) If X¯(t) converges under (SRL), its limit is a Nash equilibrium.
(2) Any global attractor of (BRD) also attracts time averages of (SRL), inde-
pendently of the noise level. In particular, since the set of Nash equilibria
is globally attracting under (BRD) in zero-sum games, this observation
extends Proposition 6.2 to the constant η case.
(3) The only ICT sets of (BRD) in potential games consist of (isolated) com-
ponents of Nash equilibria, so X¯(t) converges to one such component.
7. Discussion
7.1. Correlated observation noise. An important assumption underlying the
noisy learning model (SRL) is that the perturbations to the players’ payoff obser-
vations are stochastically independent across players and strategies. However, in
many cases of practical interest, such observations are actually correlated : in con-
gestion games for example, a choice of action corresponds to a choice of route in a
road network, and two routes that overlap would have the same uncertainty char-
acteristics over common edges/road segments (and similarly for correlations across
different players).
To account for correlations of this sort, we can consider the more general learning
model
dYkα = vkα(X) dt+ dZkα,
Xk = Qk(ηkYk),
(SRLc)
where Zkα is a family of Itô martingale processes with quadratic variation
d[Zkα, Zjβ ] = dZkα · dZkβ = Σkjαβ dt k, j ∈ N , α ∈ Ak, β ∈ Aj , (7.1)
and such that supt ‖Σ(t)‖ < 0. Obviously, if Σ is block-diagonal (i.e. Σkjαβ ∝
δαβδkj), we recover the original learning model (SRL) with uncorrelated uncer-
tainty across strategies and payoffs; otherwise, in the non-diagonal case, the co-
variance matrix Σ simply captures the possible correlations between the players’
observations.
A first example of this type is provided by Cabrales (2000) where Zkα is assumed
to be of the form dZkα =
∑d
r=1 σ
r
kα dWr with W (t) denoting a standard Wiener
process in Rd. Such correlations also occur naturally in the study of congestion
games: indeed, let G = (V, E) be a (non-oriented) graph with vertex set V and edge
set E , and let N ⊆ V ×V denote a set of origin-destination pairs in the network. In
(finite, nonsplittable) congestion games, each player k is typically identified with
an origin-destination pair (v, w) ∈ N ⊆ V × V, and his actions are drawn from a
set Ak of (acyclic) paths in G that join v to w. The cost associated to a choice
of path α ∈ Ak is then given by the total time taken to traverse path α, i.e.
`kα =
∑
r∈α `r =
∑
r∈E Prα`r, where `r denotes the corresponding delay function
of edge r ∈ E (a function of the number of users who use r ∈ E) and Prα = 1{r ∈ α}
denotes the edge-path incidence matrix of the network. As a result, if the delay
across each edge is only observable up to a random error, the players’ score updates
would take the form:
dYkα = −
∑
r∈α
(`r(X) dt+ σr dWr) = −`kα(X) dt+ dZkα, (7.2)
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with dZkα = −
∑
r∈E Prασr dWr. In turn, this leads to the covariance matrix
d[Zkα, Zjβ ] =
∑
r,r′∈E
PrαPr′βσrσr′ dWr · dWr′
=
∑
r∈E
PrαPrβσ
2
r dt =
∑
r∈α∩β
σ2r dt, (7.3)
i.e. stochastic fluctuations across different paths α, β are correlated precisely over
the paths’ common edges.
The question that arises in this context is whether the rationality analysis of the
previous sections still applies to the more general model (SRLc) with correlated
uncertainty. The short answer to this is that the qualitative part of our analysis
goes through essentially unchanged:
Proposition 7.1. Assume that (SRLc) is run with a vanishing learning parameter
η(t). Then, with notation as in the rest of the paper:
1. (SRLc) leads to no regret.
2. Dominated strategies become extinct under (SRLc).
3. Strict Nash equilibria are stochastically asymptotically stable under (SRLc).
4. In 2-player zero-sum games with an interior equilibrium, the time-averaged pro-
cess X¯(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
X(s) ds converges to the game’s set of Nash equilibria.
Finally, properties (2) and (3) above hold even without the assumption η(t)→ 0.
The proof of Proposition 7.1 is similar to that of Theorems 3.1, 4.1, 5.2, and
Proposition 6.2, so we only offer a short sketch in Appendix A. On the other hand,
the quantitative bounds that we derived (e.g. for the player’s regret or for the rate
of elimination of dominated strategies) clearly cannot hold as stated because of the
non-diagonal components of the quadratic variation matrix Σ. It is still possible to
calculate explicitly the corresponding expressions under the correlated noise model
(7.1) but the end result is fairly messy so we do not present it here.
7.2. Abrupt shocks. Another important assumption underlying the noisy learn-
ing model (SRL) (or its correlated version above) is that uncertainty enters the
process in the form of a continuous, non-anticipative diffusion process. This model
is sufficiently wide to cover the case of noise processes whose aggregate impact
scales as a function of the observation window but it does not account for discon-
tinuous jump processes that represent very abrupt perturbations (such as defaults
and stock price crashes, momentary link failures in data networks, etc.).
Processes of this type are usually modeled in probability theory as semimartin-
gales, i.e. stochastic processes that can be decomposed as a local martingale (e.g.
a Wiener process) plus an adapted process with finite variation (e.g. any piecewise
continuous martingale). Given that the Itô integral can also be defined for semi-
martingales, it would also be possible to extend the scope of (SRL) even further by
replacing the Brownian noise terms dW by an arbitary (adapted) semimartingale.
In this case however, Itô’s lemma would also carry additional terms stemming from
the discontinuous component of the noise process, thus complicating the analysis
considerably; because of this, we relegate a detailed discussion of this issue to a
future paper.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Technical proofs
Caveat. In this appendix (and, in particular, in all applications of Itô’s lemma),
we will be treating the players’ choice map Q as if it were C1. This is always
the case if the players’ penalty functions are steep (i.e. ‖dh(xn)‖ → ∞ whenever
xn → bd(X )), but not otherwise: for instance, the closest-point projection map
induced by the quadratic penalty function h(x) = 12 ‖x‖2 is piecewise smooth but
not C1. The use of Itô’s lemma in the non-steep case is justified by the fact that Q is
absolutely continuous (Rockafellar, 1970, Chap. 26) and the work of Alsmeyer and
Jaeger (2005, Theorem 2.1) who provide a nonsmooth variant of Itô’s lemma that
allows us to treat h∗ as if it were C2 whenever it appears in a stochastic integral.
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2.1. For simplicity, the player index k is suppressed
in this proof; also, all summation indices are assumed to run over the (constant)
support A′ of X(t).
By the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for the convex problem (2.4),
we get Yα−η−1θ′(Xα) = ζ where ζ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the
probability constraint
∑
α∈supp(X)Xα = 1. Itô’s formula then gives
dζ = dYα +
η˙
η2
θ′α dt− η−1θ′′α dXα −
1
2
η−1θ′′′α (dXα)
2 (A.1)
and hence:
dXα =
η
θ′′α
[
dYα +
η˙
η2
θ′α dt−
1
2η
θ′′′α (dXα)
2 − dζ
]
. (A.2)
Now, write dXα in the general form:
dXα = bα dt+
∑
β
cαβ dWβ , (A.3)
where the drift and diffusion coefficients bα and cαβ are to be determined. To
do so, recall that the Wiener processes Wα are independent (in the sense that
dWα · dWβ = δαβ), so we get (dXα)2 =
∑
β c
2
αβ dt; therefore, summing (A.2) over
α ∈ A′ and solving for dζ yields:
1
Θ′′
dζ =
∑
α
1
θ′′α
[
dYα +
η˙
η2
θ′α dt−
1
2η
θ′′′α
∑
β
c2αβ dt
]
. (A.4)
Substituting this last expression in (A.2) leads to (2.9) with U2α =
∑
β c
2
αβ , so
we are left to show that U2α has the prescribed form. To that end, by comparing
the diffusion terms of (2.9) and (A.3), we get
cαβ =
η
θ′′α
[
σαδαβ − Θ
′′
θ′′β
σβ
]
, (A.5)
and hence:
U2α =
∑
β
c2αβ =
(
η
θ′′α
)2∑
β
(
σαδαβ −Θ′′σβ
/
θ′′β
)2
=
(
η
θ′′α
)2 [
σ2α
(
1−Θ′′/θ′′α)2 +∑
β 6=α
(
Θ′′
/
θ′′β
)2
σ2β
]
, (A.6)
which concludes our derivation of (2.9).
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To show that the support of X(t) is piecewise constant on a dense open subset of
[0,∞), fix some α ∈ A and let A = {t : Xα(t) > 0} so that Ac = X−1α (0). Then, A is
open becauseX(t) is continuous (a.s.), so it suffices to show that A∪int(Ac) is dense
in [0,∞); however, this is trivially true because of the identity cl(A) ∪ int(Ac) =
[0,∞). Finally, if limx→0+ θ′(x) = −∞, standard convex analysis arguments show
that the (necessarily unique) solution of (2.4) lies in the relative interior of X
(Rockafellar, 1970, Chap. 26), so we conclude that X(t) ∈ X ◦ for all t ≥ 0 by the
well-posedness of (SRL).
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3.1. Our proof hinges on the rate-adjusted Fenchel cou-
pling
Hp ≡ 1
η
F (p, ηY ) =
1
η
· [h(p) + h∗(ηY )− 〈ηY, p〉] (A.7)
between a benchmark strategy p ∈ X and the generating process ηY . Specifically,
to begin with, the Itô formula of Lemma B.3 gives:
dHp = − η˙
η
Hp dt+
1
η
〈d(ηY ), X − p〉+ 1
2η
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
η2σ2β dt
= − η˙
η
Hp dt+
η˙
η
〈Y,X − p〉 dt+ 〈dY,X − p〉+ η
2
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σ2β dt, (A.8)
so, by combining the definition of Hp with (SRL-U), we get:
dHp = − η˙
η2
[h(p)− h(X)] dt+ 〈v,X − p〉 dt
+
∑
β
(Xβ − pβ)σβ dWβ + η
2
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σ2β dt, (A.9)
where we used the fact that h∗(ηY ) = 〈ηY,X〉 − h(X) in the first line. Therefore,
the player’s cumulative regret for not playing p up to time t will be:∫ t
0
〈v(s), p−X(s)〉 ds = Hp(0)−Hp(t) (A.10a)
−
∫ t
0
η˙(s)
η2(s)
[h(p)− h(X(s))] ds (A.10b)
+
∑
β
∫ t
0
(Xβ(s)− p)σβ(s) dWβ(s) (A.10c)
+
1
2
∑
β
∫ t
0
η(s)
∂2h∗
∂2y2β
σ2β(s) ds. (A.10d)
We now proceed to bound each term of (A.10) by a sublinear function:
a) Since Hp ≥ 0, the term (A.10a) is bounded from above as follows:
Hp(0) ≤ h(p) + h
∗(0)
η(0)
=
h(p)−minx∈X h(x)
η(0)
≤ Ω
η(0)
, (A.11)
where we have used the fact that Y (0) = 0.
b) For (A.10b), we have h(p) − h(X(s)) ≤ Ω by definition; hence, with η˙ ≤ 0, we
get:
(A.10b) ≤ −Ω
∫ t
0
η˙(s)
η2(s)
ds =
Ω
η(t)
− Ω
η(0)
= o(t). (A.12)
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c) By Lemma B.4, we readily obtain that the term (A.10c) is O(σmax
√
t log log t).
d) Finally, for (A.10d), recall that the Hessian of h∗(y) is equal to the inverse
Hessian of h(x), suitably restricted to the affine hull of the face of the simplex
spanned by x = Q(y) – see e.g. Chap. 26 in Rockafellar (1970). Thus, given
that h is K-strongly convex, (2.5) readily yields ∂2h∗
/
∂y2β ≤ K−1, and hence:
(A.10d) ≤ |A|
2K
σ2max
∫ t
0
η(s) ds, (A.13)
where σ2max = supt≥0 maxβ σ2β(t). L’Hôpital’s rule then yields t
−1 ∫ t
0
η(s) ds ∼
η(t)→ 0, so (A.10d) is also sublinear in t.
The bound (3.4) then follows by combining all of the above.
A.3. Proof of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3. We begin with some groundwork that
will be used in the proof of both propositions. Specifically, let X(t) be a solution
of (SRL) with X(0) = x ∈ X . Then, suppressing the player index k for simplicity,
we obtain:
dYα − dYβ = (vα(X)− vβ(X)) dt+ σα(X) dWα − σβ(X) dWβ
≤ −mdt− dξ, (A.14)
where ξ(t) =
∫ t
0
σβ(X(s)) dWβ(s)−
∫ t
0
σα(X(s)) dWα(s) and m is defined as in the
statement of the proposition. We thus get:
Yα(t)− Yβ(t) ≤ Yα(0)− Yβ(0)−mt− ξ(t), (A.15)
so the KKT conditions for the problem (2.4) give:
θ′(Xα(t))− θ′(Xβ(t)) ≤ η(t) · [Yα(0)− Yβ(0)−mt− ξ(t)] (A.16)
(recall that θ is steep so the solutions of (2.4) are interior). Thus, with η(t) de-
creasing, we finally get:
θ′(Xα(t)) ≤ C − η(t) · [mt+ ξ(t)] , (A.17)
where C = θ′(1) + η(0) · |Yα(0) − Yβ(0)| depends only on the initial conditions of
(SRL). This bound will be central in both proofs.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Let ρ = [ξ, ξ] denote the quadratic variation of ξ (cf. the
proof of Lemma B.4). Then, the independence of Wα and Wβ yields dρ = dξ · dξ =(
σ2α + σ
2
β
)
dt and hence:
ρ(t) =
∫ t
0
[
σ2α(X(s)) + σ
2
β(X(s))
]
ds ≤ 2σ2αβ t. (A.18)
Consequently, invoking the time-change theorem for martingales (Øksendal, 2007),
let W˜ be a Wiener process such that ξ(t) = W˜ (ρ(t)). Then, if limt→∞ ρ(t) = ∞,
by the law of the iterated logarithm, we get:
ξ(t) = W˜ (ρ(t)) ≤ (1 + ε)
√
2ρ(t) log log ρ(t) ≤ 2(1 + ε)σαβ
√
t log log t (a.s.),
(A.19)
for all ε > 0 and for all large enough t. Otherwise, if limt→∞ ρ(t) < ∞, W˜ (ρ(t))
will be bounded for all t ≥ 0 (a.s.), so we trivially get ξ(t) ≥ 2(1 + ε)σαβ
√
t log log t
for all large enough t > 0. The bound (4.8) is then obtained by combining (A.17)
with (A.19).
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Likewise, combining (A.17) and (A.18), we obtain:
P (Xα(t) > δ) = P (θ′(Xα(t)) > θ′(δ))
≤ P
(
W˜ (ρ(t)) < −mt+ C − θ
′(δ)
η(t)
)
=
1
2
erfc
[
1√
2ρ(t)
(
mt− C − θ
′(δ)
η(t)
)]
. (A.20)
Since m > 0, Assumption 1 for the rate of decay of η(t) guarantees that mtη(t) >
C − θ′(δ) for large t; (4.9) then follows by substituting (A.18) in (A.20). 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let Zαβ denote the RHS of (A.14), viz.:
dZαβ = mdt+ σβ dWβ − σα dWα. (A.21)
Then, by (A.17), we readily obtain
τδ ≤ τ˜a ≡ inf
{
t > 0 : Zαβ(t) ≤ a
}
, (A.22)
with a = η−1[C − θ′(δ)]+ (obviously, τδ = 0 if C − θ′(δ) < 0). Since Zαβ is simply
a Wiener process with drift m (recall that the diffusion coefficients σ are assumed
constant), a standard argument based on Dynkin’s formula yields E[τ˜a] = a/m and
(4.10) follows. 
A.4. Proof of Theorem 5.2. Parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 5.2 follow readily from
Proposition 5.3 – simply note that the hypothesis of Proposition 5.3 is satisfied in
both cases. As such, we only need to show that strict Nash equilibria are stochas-
tically asymptotically stable under (SRL).
To that end, let x∗ = (α∗1, . . . , α∗N ) be a strict equilibrium of G and let A∗k ≡
Ak \{α∗k}. Moreover, for all α ∈ A∗k, set
Zkα = ηk
(
Ykα − Ykα∗k
)
, (A.23)
so that X(t) → x∗ if and only if Zkα(t) → −∞ for all α ∈ A∗k, k ∈ N (cf.
Proposition B.1).
Now, fix some tolerance ε > 0 and a neighborhood U0 of x∗ in X . Since x∗ is a
strict equilibrium of G, there exist mk > 0 and a neighborhood U ⊆ U0 of x∗ such
that
vkα∗k(x)− vkα(x) ≥ mk for all x ∈ U and for all α ∈ A∗k, k ∈ N . (A.24)
With this in mind, letM > 0 be sufficiently large so that X(t) ∈ U if Zkα(t) ≤ −M
for all α ∈ A∗k, k ∈ N (that such an M exists is again a consequence of Proposition
B.1); furthermore, with a fair degree of hindsight, assume also that
M > m−1k ηk(0)σ
2
k,max log(N/ε) for all k = 1, . . . , N , (A.25)
where σ2k,max = maxα,x σ
2
kα(x). We will show that if Zkα(0) ≤ −2M , thenX(t) ∈ U
for all t ≥ 0 and Zkα(t)→ −∞ with probability at least 1− ε.
Indeed, assume that Zkα(0) ≤ −2M in (A.23) and define the escape time:
τU = inf{t > 0 : X(t) /∈ U}. (A.26)
The stochastic dynamics (SRL) then give:
d
(
Ykα − Ykα∗k
)
=
[
vkα − vkα∗k
]
dt+ σkα dWkα − σkα∗k dWkα∗k , (A.27)
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so, for all t ≤ τU , we will have:
Zkα(t) = Zkα(0) + ηk(t)
∫ t
0
[
vkα(X(s))− vkα∗k(X(s))
]
ds+ ηk(t)ξk(t)
≤ −2M − ηk(t) [mt− ξk(t)] , (A.28)
where we have set
ξk(t) =
∫ t
0
σkα(X(s)) dWkα(s)−
∫ t
0
σkα∗k(X(s)) dWkα∗k(s). (A.29)
We will first show that P(τU <∞) ≤ ε. To that end, note that the time-change
theorem for martingales (Øksendal, 2007, Cor. 8.5.4) provides a standard Wiener
process W˜k(t) such that ξk(t) = W˜k(ρk(t)) where ρk = [ξk, ξk] is the quadratic
variation of ξk. Then, from the fact that η is nonincreasing, we conclude that
Zkα(t) ≤ −M whenever mkt− W˜k(ρk(t)) ≥ −M/ηk(0). Accordingly, with ρk(t) ≤
2σ2k,maxt (cf. the proof of Proposition 4.2), it suffices to show that the hitting time
τ0 = inf
{
t > 0 : W˜k(t) =
mkt
2σ2k,max
+
M
ηk(0)
for some k ∈ N
}
(A.30)
is finite with probability not exceeding ε. However, if a trajectory of W˜k(t) has
W˜k(t) ≤ mkt/(2σ2k,max) +M/ηk(0) for all t ≥ 0, we will also have
W˜k(ρk(t)) ≤ mkρk(t)
2σ2k,max
+
M
ηk(0)
≤ mkt+ M
ηk(0)
, (A.31)
so τU must be infinite for every trajectory of W˜ = (W˜1, . . . , W˜N ) with infinite
τ0, i.e. P(τU < +∞) ≤ P(τ0 < +∞). Thus, if we write Ek for the event that
W˜k(t) ≥ mkt/(2σ2k,max) + M/ηk(0) for some finite t ≥ 0, the hitting-time analysis
of Karatzas and Shreve (1998, p. 197) for a Brownian motion with drift yields
P(Ek) = e−λkM with λk = mk/(ηk(0)σ2k,max). Thus, by construction of M , we
obtain:
P(τ0 < +∞) = P
(⋃
k
Ek
)
≤
∑
k
P(Ek) =
∑
k
e−λkM ≤ ε. (A.32)
Thus, by conditioning on the event τU = +∞ and invoking Assumption 1 and
Lemma B.4, Eq. (A.28) finally yields
Zkα(t) ≤ −2M − ηk(t) ·
[
mt− ξk(t)
] ∼ −ηk(t) ·mt→ −∞ (a.s.). (A.33)
We conclude that Zkα(t) → −∞ for all α ∈ A∗k, k ∈ N , so limt→∞X(t) = x∗
(conditionally a.s.) and our proof is complete.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 6.2. Let Fp(t) =
∑
k=1,2 Fk(pk, ηk(t)Yk(t)) where
p = (p1, p2) is an interior Nash equilibrium of G. Using the Itô formula of Lemma
LEARNING IN GAMES WITH NOISY PAYOFF OBSERVATIONS 29
B.3, we get:
dFp =
∑
k,β
(Xkβ − pkβ) d(ηkYk) + 1
2
∑
k,β
∂2h∗k
∂y2kβ
η2kσ
2
kβ dt
=
∑
k=1,2
η˙k 〈Yk, Xk − p〉 dt (A.34a)
+
∑
k=1,2
ηk 〈vk, Xk − pk〉 dt (A.34b)
+
∑
k,β
ηk(Xkβ − pkβ)σkβ dWkβ (A.34c)
+
1
2
∑
k,β
∂2h∗k
∂y2kβ
η2kσ
2
kβ dt, (A.34d)
where we substituted dY from (SRL) to obtain (A.34b) and (A.34c).
We now claim that Fp(t) grows sublinearly in t; indeed:
a) Lemma B.4 shows that Y (t) = O(t), so there exist Mk > 0, k = 1, 2, such that∑
k=1,2
∫ t
0
η˙k(s) 〈Xk(s)− p, Yk(s)〉 ds ≤
∑
k=1,2
Mk
∫ t
0
|η˙k(s)| s ds = o(t), (A.35)
where the sublinearity estimate follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that
ηk(t)→ 0: ∫ t
0
η˙k(s)s ds = ηk(t)t−
∫ t
0
ηk(s) ds = o(t). (A.36)
b) The term (A.34b) is identically zero because G is zero-sum and p is an interior
equilibrium of G:
〈v1(X), X1 − p1〉+ 〈v2(X), X2 − p2〉
= u1(X1, X2)− u1(p1, X2) + u2(X1, X2)− u2(X1, p2) = 0. (A.37)
c) The term (A.34c) is sublinear (a.s.) on account of (the proof of) Lemma B.4.
d) Finally, for (A.34d), the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 yields:
1
2
∑
k,β
∫ t
0
∂2h∗k
∂y2kβ
η2k(s)σ
2
kβ(X(s)) ds ≤
1
2K
∑
k,β
σ2k,max
∫ t
0
η2k(s) ds, (A.38)
with σ2k,max = maxα∈Ak maxx∈X σ
2
kα(x) defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.2.
Since ηk(t)→ 0, this last integral is also sublinear in t, as claimed.
Assume now that lim supt→∞ Fp(t) ≥ m for some m > 0 (otherwise we would
have the stronger result X(t) → p). Then, Lemma B.2 gives |Ykα(t) − Ykβ(t)| =
O(Fp(t)) = o(t), so our claim follows from Theorem 6.1.
A.6. Proof of Theorem 6.3. As we mentioned, the proof follows the ideas of
Hofbauer et al. (2009). Specifically, from (SRL), we have:
Yk(t) = Yk(0) +
∫ t
0
vk(X(s)) ds+
∫ t
0
σk(X(s)) dWk(s)
= tvk(X¯(t)) + Yk(0) + ξk(t), (A.39)
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where we have set ξkα(t) =
∫ t
0
σkα(X(s)) dWkα(s) and we have used the fact that
G is a 2-player game in order to carry the integral inside the argument of vk.
Consequently, by the definition (2.4) of the players’ regularized best response maps,
Xk(t) = Qk(ηk(t)Yk(t)) solves the (strictly) concave maximization problem:
maximize 〈vk(X¯(t)), xk〉+ 1
t
〈Yk(0) + ξk(t), xk〉 − 1
tηk(t)
hk(xk),
subject to xk ∈ Xk.
(A.40)
By Lemma B.4 and Assumption 1, the last two terms of (A.40) vanish as t → 0.
Hence, by the maximum theorem of Berge (1997, p. 116) applied to the parametric
optimization problem (A.40) with parameter t, it follows that Xk(t) lies within a
vanishing distance of arg maxxk∈Xk〈vk(X¯(t)), xk〉 ≡ brk(X¯(t)).
On the other hand, differentiating X¯(t) yields:
d
dt
X¯(t) = t−1X(t)− t−2
∫ t
0
X(s) ds = t−1
[
X(t)− X¯(t)] , (A.41)
and, after changing time to τ = log t, the expression above becomes ddtX¯(t) =
X − X¯. Combining all of the above, we conclude that X¯(t) tracks a perturbed
version of the best reply dynamics (BRD) in the sense of Benaïm et al. (2005,
Def. III), and our assertion follows from Theorem 3.6 in the same paper.
A.7. Correlated uncertainty. We provide below a short sketch of the proof of
Proposition 7.1, highlighting the points of departure from the proofs of Theorems
3.1, 4.1, 5.2, and Proposition 6.2.
First, for the no-regret analysis of (SRLc), note that (A.10) still holds essentially
as stated, except for the term (A.10d) which should be replaced by the quantity
1
2
∑
β
∫ t
0
η(s) tr[Hess(h∗(Y (s)) Σ(s)] ds. (A.42)
Since the matrices Hess(h∗) and Σ are both bounded in norm (by the strong con-
vexity of h and by assumption, respectively), the rest of the proof of Theorem 3.1
goes through exactly as in the uncorrelated case, except that σmax must now be
replaced by supt ‖Σ(t)‖.
For the elimination of dominated strategies and the stochastic asymptotic sta-
bility of strict equilibria, we first need to replace all terms of the form σkαdWkα
in (4.5) and (A.29) by dZkα. Then, it suffices to note that the rest of the proof
of Theorems 4.1 and 5.2 only relies on the fact that the quadratic variation of ξ
satisfies an inequality of the form d[ξ, ξ] ≤M dt for some M > 0 (a consequence of
the fact that Σ is assumed bounded).
Finally, for our result on time-averages, the only nontrivial change in the proof
of Proposition 6.2 is that the term
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σ2β dt that appears in (A.34) must be
replaced by the correlated variant tr[Hess(h∗(Y (s)) Σ(s)] ds. This term can be
bounded as in the no-regret case above, so (A.38) still holds (but with a different
constant than σ2max/K); the rest of the proof then goes through as in the uncorre-
lated setting.
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Appendix B. Auxiliary results
B.1. Properties of the Fenchel coupling. In this appendix, we collect some
basic properties of the Fenchel coupling and regularized best response maps. To
state them, let ∆ denote the d-dimensional simplex of Rn and let h : ∆ → R be a
penalty function on ∆ (i.e. h is continuous and strongly convex on ∆ and smooth
on the relative interior of any face of ∆). Also, recall that the regularized best
response map Q : Rn → ∆ induced by h is given by
Q(y) = arg max
x∈∆
{〈y, x〉 − h(x)}, y ∈ Rn, (B.1)
while the Fenchel coupling between p ∈ ∆ and y ∈ Rn is defined as:
F (p, y) = h(p) + h∗(y)− 〈y, p〉 , (B.2)
where
h∗(y) = max
x∈∆
{〈y, x〉 − h(x)} (B.3)
denotes the convex conjugate of h. We then have:
Proposition B.1. Let h : ∆→ R be a penalty function on ∆ with strong convexity
constant K. Then:
(1) Q is 1/K-Lipschitz and Q(y) = dh∗(y).
(2) If yα − yβ → −∞ for some β 6= α, then Qα(y)→ 0.
(3) F (p, y) ≥ 12 ‖Q(y)− p‖2 for all p ∈ ∆ and for all y; in particular, F (p, y) ≥ 0
with equality if and only if p = Q(y).
(4) If F (p, yj) → +∞ for some sequence yj ∈ Rn, the sequence xj = Q(yj)
converges to the union of faces of ∆ that do not contain p; more precisely:
lim infj→∞{xj,α : α ∈ supp(p)} = 0.
Proof. The first part of Proposition B.1 is well known (see e.g. Nesterov, 2009;
Shalev-Shwartz, 2011). The rest of our claims are due to Mertikopoulos and Sand-
holm (2016); we only provide a proof below for completeness and ease of reference.
Part 2. Let yj be a sequence in Rn such that yj,α−yj,β → −∞, set xj = Q(yj) and
assume (by descending to a subsequence if necessary) that xj,α > ε > 0 for all n.
By definition, we have 〈yj , xj〉 − h(xj) ≥ 〈yj , x′〉 − h(x′) for all x′ ∈ ∆, so if we set
x′j = xj + ε(eβ − eα), we readily obtain
ε(yj,α − yj,β) ≥ h(xj)− h(x′j) ≥ −(hmax − hmin). (B.4)
This contradicts our original assumption that yj,α−yj,β → −∞; since ∆ is compact,
we get x∗α = 0 for any limit point x∗ of xj , i.e. Qα(yj)→ 0.
Part 3. Let x = Q(y) so that h∗(y) = 〈y, x〉 − h(x) and F (p, y) = h(p) − h(x) −
〈y, p− x〉. Since x = dh∗(y) by Part 1, we will also have
〈y, x′ − x〉 ≤ h(x′)− h(x) for all x′ ∈ ∆, (B.5)
by standard convex analysis arguments (Rockafellar, 1970, Chap. 26). On the other
hand, letting z = p− x, the definition (2.5) of strong convexity yields:
h(x+ tz) ≤ th(p) + (1− t)h(x)− 12Kt(1− t) ‖z‖2 for all t ∈ (0, 1). (B.6)
Hence, combining (B.6) with (B.5) for x′ = x+ tz, we get
h(x) + 〈y, tz〉 ≤ th(p) + (1− t)h(x)− 12Kt(1− t) ‖z‖2 , (B.7)
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and, after rearranging and dividing by t, we obtain
F (p, y) = h(p)− h(x)− 〈y, z〉 ≥ 12K(1− t) ‖z‖2 . (B.8)
Our claim then follows by letting t→ 0+ in (B.8).
Part 4. Let Λp denote the union of faces of ∆ that do not contain p and set ∆p ≡
∆ \Λp. Then, if x = Q(y) ∈ ∆p for some y ∈ Rn, the function h(x+ t(p− x)) will
be finite and smooth for all t in a neighborhood of 0 (simply note that x+ t(p− x)
lies in the relative interior of the same face of ∆ for small t). This implies that h
admits a two-sided derivative at x along p − x, so we will also have 〈y, p− x〉 =
h′(x; p−x) < +∞ by Theorem 23.5 in Rockafellar (1970); in particular, this shows
that F (p, y) = h(p)− h(x)− h′(x; p− x) < +∞ whenever x = Q(y) ∈ ∆p.
Assume now ad absurdum that xj = Q(yj) has a limit point in ∆p, so there
exists a compact neighborhood K of p in ∆p which is visited infinitely often by xj .
By continuity and compactness, this implies that there exists some M > 0 such
that F (p, yj) = h(p)−h(xj)−h′(xj ; p−xj) < M infinitely often, a contradiction to
our original assumption that F (p, yj) → +∞. We conclude that every limit point
of xj lies in ∆p, as claimed. 
For the proof of Proposition 6.2, we also require the following lemma:
Lemma B.2. Let p ∈ ∆◦ and assume that the sequence yj has F (p, yj) ≥ m for
some m > 0. Then, for all α, β, there exists some K > 0 such that |yj,α − yj,β | ≤
KF (p, yj).
Proof. By descending to a subsequence if necessary, assume ad absurdum that yj,α−
yj,β ≥ KjF (p, yj) for some increasing sequence Kj → +∞. Then, by relabeling
indices (and passing to a finer subsequence if needed), we may assume that a) yj,α ≥
yj,γ ≥ yj,β for all γ = 1, . . . , d; and b) the index set {1, . . . , d} can be decomposed
into two nonempty sets, A0 and A∞, such that yj,α − yj,γ ≤ K ′F (p, yj) for some
K ′ > 0 and for all γ ∈ A0, while yj,α − yj,γ > K ′jF (p, yj) for some K ′j → +∞ and
for all γ ∈ A∞. Thus, letting xj = Q(yj), we get:
〈yj , p− xj〉 =
∑n
γ=1
yj,γ(pγ − xj,γ) =
∑n
γ=1
(yj,γ − yj,α)(pγ − xj,γ)
=
∑
γ∈A0
(yj,γ − yj,α)(pγ − xj,γ) +
∑
γ∈A∞
(yj,γ − yj,α)(pγ − xj,γ). (B.9)
By construction, the first sum is bounded in absolute value by 2dK ′F (p, yj). As
for the second sum, since F (p, yj) ≥ M > 0, we will also have yj,α − yj,γ → +∞,
so xj,γ → 0 by Proposition B.1; with p ∈ ∆◦, we then get lim infj(pγ − xj,γ) ≥
δ for some δ > 0, so every A∞ summand in (B.9) is eventually bounded from
above by −δK ′jF (p, yj). This shows that 〈yj , p− xj〉 ≤ −K ′′j F (p, yj) for some
positive sequence K ′′j → +∞; however, 〈yj , p− xj〉 = h(p) − h(xj) − F (p, yj), a
contradiction. 
B.2. Stochastic analysis. From a stochastic analysis standpoint, the importance
of the Fenchel coupling is captured by the following calculation:
Lemma B.3. Let dYα = µα dt+
∑
β σαβ dWβ be an Itô process with values in Rn
and set X(t) = Q(Y (t)). Then, for all p ∈ ∆, we have:
dF (p, Y ) =
∑
β
(Xβ − pβ) dYβ + 1
2
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σ2β dt. (B.10)
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Proof. Let H(t) = F (p, Y (t)), t ≥ 0. Then, Itô’s formula yields:
dH =
∑
β
∂F
∂yβ
dYβ +
1
2
∑
β,γ
∂2F
∂yβ∂yγ
dYβ · dYγ
=
∑
β
(
∂h∗
∂yβ
− xβ
)
dYβ +
1
2
∑
β,γ
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σβσγδβγ dt
=
∑
β
(Xβ − pβ) dYβ + 1
2
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σ2β dt, (B.11)
where we used the definition of F and Proposition B.1 in the second and third
lines. 
Finally, Lemma B.4 is a useful order comparison result that we employ through-
out:
Lemma B.4. Let W (t) = (W1(t), . . . ,Wn(t)), t ≥ 0, be a Wiener processes in Rn
and let Z(t) be a bounded, continuous process in Rn. Then, for every continuous
function f : [0,∞)→ (0,∞), we have
f(t) +
∫ t
0
Z(s) · dW (s) ∼ f(t) as t→∞ (a.s.), (B.12)
whenever limt→∞ (t log log t)
−1/2
f(t) = +∞.
Proof. Let ξ(t) =
∫ t
0
Z(s) · dW (s) = ∑nα=1 ∫ t0 Zα(s) dWα(s). Then, the quadratic
variation ρ = [ξ, ξ] of ξ satisfies:
d[ξ, ξ] = dξ · dξ =
∑n
α=1
ZαZβδαβ dt ≤M dt, (B.13)
where M = supt≥0 ‖Z(t)‖2 < +∞ (recall that Z(t) is bounded by assumption).
On the other hand, by the time-change theorem for martingales (Øksendal, 2007,
Cor. 8.5.4), there exists a Wiener process W˜ (t) such that ξ(t) = W˜ (ρ(t)), and
hence:
f(t) + ξ(t)
f(t)
= 1 +
W˜ (ρ(t))
f(t)
. (B.14)
Obviously, if limt→∞ ρ(t) < ∞, we will have lim supt→∞|W˜ (ρ(t))| < ∞ (a.s.) so
there is nothing to show. Otherwise, if limt→∞ ρ(t) = ∞, the quadratic variation
bound (B.13) and the law of the iterated logarithm yield:∣∣W˜ (ρ(t))∣∣
f(t)
≤
∣∣W˜ (ρ(t))∣∣√
2ρ(t) log log ρ(t)
×
√
2Mt log logMt
f(t)
→ 0 as t→∞, (B.15)
and our claim follows. 
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